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in Britain.25 Although well intentioned, supporters of the 2006 Pardon 
Bill clung to the outmoded notion that a generation of brave “lions 
were led by donkeys” to the slaughter. Death and Deliverance shows 
that these “donkeys” seriously weighed the pros and cons of capital 
punishment and—nine times out of ten—chose to be merciful. The 
book is a true asset to military historians and a worthwhile read for 
anyone looking to gain a better understanding of the First World War.
alyssa cundy, wilfrid laurier university
In Peace Prepared: Innovation and Adaptation in Canada’s Cold 
War Army. Andrew B. Godefroy. Vancouver: University of British 
Columbia Press, 2014. Pp. 292. 
During the first two decades of the Cold War, with the invention of the 
atomic bomb by the United States and its replication by the Soviet 
Union, the Canadian Army was exposed to a completely new type 
of warfare. In this extremely well-written and thoroughly researched 
work, Andrew B. Godefroy explores what the Canadian Army did to 
be successful on this new conventional-nuclear battlefield. Employing 
a diverse collection of archival records and published material such as 
the Canadian Army Journal and Volunteer Review and Military and 
Naval Gazette, Godefroy introduces the reader with a much-needed 
reinterpretation of the institutional development and organizational 
culture of Canada’s early Cold War Army as well as an explanation 
of how and why the army evolved as it did. The book further provides 
important insights into how politics, military personalities, accident 
and contingency as well as the impact of the information age affected 
the design and the creation of a modern professional army prepared 
to fight the battles of a conventional-nuclear war.
Godefroy’s work questions the prevailing historiography that the 
postwar Canadian Army “lacked any strategic culture that could 
enable it to innovate and adapt at the same level as its Cold War-
era allies” (p. 11). As the author observes, this situation is the result 
of the lack of investigation of the Canadian military innovation and 
2  Douglas C. Peifer, “The Past in the Present: Passion, Politics, and the Historical 
Profession in the German and British Pardon Campaigns,” Journal of Military 
History 71, no. 4 (October 2007): 1107–1132. 
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adaptation process for the post-1945 period, studies having focused 
until now on the higher levels of military politics or the lower level 
of battlefield operations. Departing from those positions, Godefroy 
adopts Paul Kennedy’s “history from the middle” approach,16 a far 
more comprehensive analysis that helps understand the military 
problem solving process of the “middle managers of war.” This 
approach enables Godefroy to explore how and why the Canadian 
Army officers (the captains, majors, and lieutenant-colonels) and 
the civilian defence personnel (the scientists, designers, engineers, 
technicians, and administrators of the army) got things done. In Peace 
Prepared persuasively argues that the Canadian Army during the 
early Cold War years had a strategic culture and was far more capable 
of innovating and adapting than previous works have assumed. 
Organized into six chapters, Godefroy’s study covers the Canadian 
Army’s answer to the threat of a possible third world war between 
the end of the Second World War in 1945 and the unification of the 
three armed services into a single Canadian Forces in 1968. The 
first chapter traces the development and maturation of the strategic 
thinking culture of the land forces from the late nineteenth century 
until the end of the Second World War. Chapter 2 examines the 
influence of the demobilization on the army’s combat development 
process and the army’s effort to reshape its frameworks to continue to 
innovate and adapt in the five years following the Second World War. 
Chapter 3 analyses the response of the Canadian Army in the first 
half of the 1950s to military problems associated with the defence 
of Canada, the conduct of limited “hot” war in Korea, and the 
deterrence of war in Europe against the Soviet Union. The chapter 
thus highlights the increasingly erroneous conclusions emerging from 
the older methodologies and the need for the Canadian Army to 
improve its use of quantitative data and adopt mathematical models 
in military problem solving when approaching the conventional-
nuclear battlefield. 
Chapter 4 shows that, even though a portion of the Canadian 
military between 1954 and 1958 did not understand the true 
characteristics of atomic war, the army was able to solve many critical 
military problems it faced, such as the need for true land mobility, 
and to develop a systems-based approach to problem solving. Chapter 
1  Paul Kennedy, “History from the Middle: The Case of the Second World War,” 
Journal of Military History 74 (2010): 35–74. 
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5 explains how the existing army combat development organizations, 
facing important budget cuts between 1958 and 1964, were able 
to improve significant aspects of modern military problem solving 
by adopting new quantitative methodologies, such as modern war 
games, to analyze and evaluate the latest operational concepts in 
the conventional-nuclear battlefield and, in this way, propose more 
appropriate solutions. Chapter 6 details the difficult attempt of the 
army to sustain institutional combat development during the process of 
integration of the three armed services into a single unified Canadian 
Forces between 1963 and 1968. According to Godefroy, with these 
defence reforms, “the government essentially denied the army any 
further control over its own vision and coerced the institution into 
adopting a specific politically driven force structure derived neither 
from analysis of the future security environment nor any robust land 
force concept development and experimentation” (p. 210). 
One of the author’s central objectives is to refute the prevailing 
idea in the historiography that, because the Canadian Army was 
not able to exert great influence over its Cold War allies, it lacked a 
strategic culture and hence was not able to prepare for possible future 
wars. As Godefroy explains, this position is not sustainable in regard 
of the numerous evidences available to the researcher in the archives. 
One could add that it would have been difficult—and still is—for 
such a small military institution as the Canadian military to be a 
major influence on American and British thinking, countries with 
much larger and wealthier armies. Since the Canadian Army was part 
of a greater alliance, its officials had to collaborate on the creation 
of allied future operating concepts so that the Canadian formations 
could be easily interoperable with its allies in future conflicts. It 
was thus normal that the Cold War-era allied doctrine formed 
the basis from which the Canadian Army would develop its own 
distinctive capabilities in response to the Soviet threat. Even though 
the Canadian Army had to follow the allied operating concepts, it 
was able to critically think, innovate and adapt to the new battlefield 
as well as effectively prepare its own components during the first 
two decades of the Cold War. As Godefroy suggests: “As in other 
nato forces, conceptual and doctrinal design lay at the core of 
the Canadian Army’s systemic approach to military problem solving 
both in peace and war, and without it the army would have been 
nothing other than a poorly armed mob” (p. 10). 
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If In Peace Prepared traces back the institutional development 
and organizational culture of Canada’s early Cold War Army, one 
of its strengths is the author’s ability to show where the army 
jurisdiction ended and the influence of the political sphere began. Of 
course, the Canadian Army military problem solving process failed 
on its own sometimes. But, as the author convincingly argues, the 
impact of the Canadian political system was one of the many factors 
that could also affect the process. In fact, even though the Canadian 
Army developed an effective combat development cycle during the 
first two decades of the Cold War, it is important to remember that 
this process existed only to inform and guide civilian politicians and 
bureaucrats’ force development decisions, not control them. When 
there was a difference of views, especially in time of peace and when 
the money was scarce, this could bring the politicians to ignore the 
professional advice received from the military. 
Although Godefroy’s overall argument and presentation are 
very strong, one critique can be made with regard to content. It 
would have been interesting to compare at some point the military 
problem solving process and the solutions adopted by Canada’s Cold 
War-era allies regarding the problems they all faced. In this way, 
it would have been easier for the reader to assess the effectiveness 
of the Canadian combat development process and see that the 
Canadian Army was able to innovate and adapt at the level as is 
suggested by the author.
Ultimately, by stressing the evolution of Canadian Army strategic 
thinking and institutional development as well as what the Canadian 
Army did to be successful on the new conventional-nuclear battlefield 
during the first two decades of the Cold War, In Peace Prepared is 
a major addition to Canadian historiography. Written in a clear and 
compelling style, this work will appeal to academics and professional 
military personnel who wish to learn how big and complex is the task 
to plan, establish, build and manage a modern professional army.
caroline d’amours, royal military college of canada
Stout Hearts: The British and Canadians in Normandy, 1944. Ben 
Kite. Solihull, UK: Helion and Company, 2014. Pp. 488.
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